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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper develops a model of heterogeneous producers to examine the 
economic causes of IPR infringement and its consequences for the welfare of the interest 
groups and the pricing and adoption of a new technology (i.e., a genetically modified 
seed) in the context of a small open developing economy. Enforcement of IPRs, and 
pricing and adoption of the new technology are modeled as a sequential game between 
the government that enforces the IPRs, a foreign innovating firm that prices the new 
technology, and the developing country’s producers who make the production and 
cheating decisions. Analytical results show that complete deterrence of IPR infringement 
is not always economically optimal. IPR infringement affects the welfare of the interest 
groups and has important ramifications for the pricing and adoption of the new 
technology. The quantitative nature of the results depends critically on the existing 
labeling regime. The analysis also shows that differences in the level of IPR enforcement 
provide an alternative justification for (and explanation of) differences in the pricing of 
the new technology in different countries around the world – a strategy adopted by 
leading innovators in the sector. Finally, the results suggest that if the penalties for IPR 
infringement under the TRIPs agreement follow the custom of retaliatory sanctions under 
the GATT, enforcement of IPRs will remain imperfect and the innovators’ ability to 
obtain value for their biotech traits will still be limited. 
 
KEYWORDS:  biotechnology, enforcement, infringement, intellectual property rights, 
TRIPs agreement  ii
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Parallel revolutions in molecular biology and the legal framework that assigns intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) to plant genetic resources have resulted in the emergence of agricultural 
biotechnology and the introduction of genetically modified (GM) products into the food system. 
IPRs create economic incentives for research and development by making the innovator the 
residual claimant of the benefits associated with the new technology. Whereas IPRs purport to 
protect intellectual property, full appropriation of the benefits from the innovation is not a given.  
When infringement of IPRs (i.e., piracy) is profitable, rational economic agents’ 
compliance with IPR provisions is by no means assured. Costly monitoring and enforcement are 
required to deter unauthorized (illegal) use of the new technology. Experience from various 
countries around the world indicates that IPR enforcement is far from being perfect and many 
successful innovations are subject to piracy (Maskus). This is particularly true in developing 
countries where there is a growing opposition to the very granting of IPRs for agricultural crops. 
In addition to the domestic surplus transfers to foreign firms/IPR holders in the form of 
monopolistic rents, concerns of developing countries include environmental safety and food 
security (Mansfield; Taylor; Ringo). The result is a widespread violation of innovators’ IPRs in 
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these countries that has become a major international issue (on the debate on IPRs between 
industrialized countries (the “North”) and developing countries (the “South”) see Maskus). 
The concerns about weak IPR protection resulted in the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) during the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The 
TRIPs agreement is administered by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and allows countries 
whose innovating firms’ IPRs are being violated to retaliate and penalize the violating 
country/enforcer of IPRs under the GATT. Even though the TRIPs agreement is to come fully 
into force within the next few years, an agreement on the magnitude of the fines that can be 
imposed is yet to be reached. 
While innovators have been active in lobbying for the effective enforcement of their 
IPRs, their pricing behavior reveals a preferential treatment of customers that respect their IPRs 
the least. In many cases the prices charged by multinational firms/IPR holders in markets with 
lax enforcement of IPRs are significantly lower than the prices charged in markets where IPRs 
are effectively enforced. In Argentina for instance where 50 to 85% of the RoundUp Ready 
soybean seeds grown are either seeds purchased from the black market (25 to 50%) or/and seeds 
saved by the farmer from the previous year’s crop (25 to 35%), the prices charged by the 
innovating firm (Monsanto) are less than half the prices charged to US soybean producers (US 
General Accounting Office). This discrepancy has raised concerns by US producers who feel that 
they are being penalized for being “honest” (Holmberg). One conclusion of this paper is that they 
are probably right. 
Although there is a growing literature on the consequences of IPR introduction for 
investment in research, the development of improved varieties, the structure of the biotechnology 




(Just and Hueth; Moschini and Lapan; Lesser; Hayenga; Perrin; Alston and Venner; Fulton and 
Giannakas), the analysis of IPR infringement by the users of biotechnology is rather heuristic in 
nature. Studies on IPR enforcement problems have mainly focused on new technology imitation 
by rival firms (for a review of this literature see Perrin). Despite the incentives for, and the 
incidence of, IPR infringement by producers, this issue has not been analyzed systematically. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the economic causes of IPR infringement by 
producers and its consequences for the welfare of the interest groups and the pricing and 
adoption of the new technology. Specifically, this study analyzes the causes and consequences of 
unauthorized use by producers of a genetically modified seed that is developed and produced by 
a foreign seed company and is protected by IPRs. The case where producers comply completely 
with the provisions of IPRs (or, alternatively, the case where IPR enforcement is perfect) is also 
examined and used as a benchmark for the analysis of the consequences of IPR infringement.  
Although the enforcement of innovator’s rights is an issue of relevance for most (if not 
all) areas where IPRs are introduced, this study concentrates on enforcement of IPRs in a 
developing country. The developing country is a small open economy in the production of both 
the traditional and GM crops (i.e., the prices of these crops are not affected by domestic 
production decisions), and enforcement of the seed company’s IPRs is the responsibility of the 
domestic government. The analysis therefore focuses on cases where IPRs granted to the 
innovating firm in its home country are also valid in the developing country so that IPR 
infringement (i.e., use of the new technology without paying a royalty fee to the innovator) is 
illegal. The implications (relevance) of the analysis for the case where the developing country 
does not recognize IPRs granted elsewhere and/or has not yet had to comply with the TRIPs 




Note that the paper can be placed in the context of the North/South debate on IPRs, by 
viewing the innovating firm as a firm from the North (i.e., an industrialized country) and the 
small open developing economy as a country from the South. While the analysis focuses on the 
case where the innovator is a foreign firm, the main results regarding the level of IPR protection 
and the pricing and adoption of the new technology also apply to the case where the innovator is 
a firm from the developing country (i.e., a domestic firm, see footnote 14). 
IPR enforcement, pricing and adoption of the new technology (GM seed) are modeled as 
a sequential game between a government that is responsible for the enforcement of IPRs, the 
innovator who prices the GM seed, and the producers who make the production and cheating 
decisions. The government moves first and determines its IPR enforcement policy knowing 
exactly how its decisions will affect the (optimizing) behavior of the seed company and 
producers. Once the audit policy and the penalties for IPR infringement are announced, the 
innovator decides on the price of the GM seed that it will supply in the domestic market. Finally, 
after the decisions of the government and the innovator have been carried out, the farmers decide 
on whether they will adopt the new technology and, if so, whether they will comply with the 
provisions of IPRs (i.e., pay the fee associated with the use of the GM seed).  
To avoid Nash equilibria involving non-credible strategies, the problem is solved using 
backward induction (Kreps; Gibbons). The problem of the farmers is considered first, the 
problem of the innovator follows, and the solution of the government’s problem determines the 
(subgame perfect) equilibrium enforcement of IPRs, and the price, quantity, and adoption of the 
new technology. Different scenarios concerning the enforcement parameters controlled by the 




examined within this framework. Finally, the analysis considers the situation in which IPR 
enforcement is the innovator’s responsibility.  
Note that this is an ex post analysis of IPR infringement in the sense that domestic 
enforcement decisions have no effect on the development of this specific technology - the 
innovating seed company has developed the GM seed in question, has been granted IPRs, and its 
problem is to determine the price of the new technology and the quantity that will supply in the 
developing country under concern. Also, implicit in this analysis is the assumption that GM 
seeds used illegally (i.e., seeds bought from the black market and seeds saved by the farmer from 
the previous year’s crop) are perfect substitutes for GM seeds purchased from the innovator - the 
agronomic characteristics and production potential of GM seeds purchased from the innovating 
firm are identical to those used illegally. 
Other than formally analyzing IPR infringement, a distinct feature of this study is that it 
relaxes the (conventional) assumption of producer homogeneity. Instead, farmers are postulated 
to differ in the relative returns they receive from different crops, which in turn stems from 
differences in such things as geography, education, experience, management skills, degree of 
specialization etc. Producer heterogeneity in terms of production factors is a key component in 
the model and is critical in understanding the existence of both traditional and new technologies 
in the market, as well as the non-compliance with IPR provisions of part (and not all) of the new 
technology users. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section analyzes technology 
pricing and adoption decisions when enforcement of IPRs is perfect. The economic causes of 
IPR infringement and its consequences for the welfare of the interests groups and the pricing and 




where the final product is not labeled, and the case where enforcement is carried out by the 
innovating firm. The implications of the analysis for innovator’s pricing strategies are discussed 
before the concluding section of the paper. 
 
BENCHMARK CASE: PERFECT ENFORCEMENT OF IPRS  
Producers’ Problem   
Consider a producer that is determining whether to produce a unit of a traditional (non-
GM) crop or a unit of a new GM crop. Let A˛[0, 1] denote the attribute that differentiates 
producers. A producer with attribute A has the following net returns function: 
 
A p p s
t t t g P + - =   If a unit of traditional crop is produced   
(1) 
A p p s
gm gm gm f P + - =   If a unit of GM crop is produced 
 
The parameters  t p  and  gm p  are the farm prices (net of all production costs except for 
seed) for the traditional crop and the GM crop, respectively;  s
t p  and  s
gm p  are the costs of the 
seed required to produce the traditional and the GM crops, respectively; A is the differentiating 
attribute that takes values between zero and one; and g and j are non-negative return premium 
factors associated with the production of the traditional and the GM crop, respectively. The 
traditional crop receives a price premium but is more expensive to produce than its GM 
counterpart (i.e.,  t p > gm p  and  s
t p > s
gm p ).
2  
                                                 
2 When the traditional and GM crops are labeled and marketed separately, the farm price differential between the 
two crops is determined by the consumer demand schedules and the size of segregation costs. Ceteris paribus, the 
higher is the consumer willingness-to-pay for the traditional product versus its GM counterpart, the greater is the 
price premium received by producers of the traditional crop. On the other hand, the greater are the segregation costs 
associated with the production of the traditional crop, the lower is the effective farm price of this crop (Giannakas 




To allow for a positive supply of traditional and GM crops, it is assumed that 
( ) ( ) 0 p p p p s
t t
s
gm gm > - - - > -f g , while, to retain tractability of the model, the analysis 
assumes that producers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of A. The implications 
of relaxing this assumption to allow a concentration of producers at the ends of the spectrum 
(i.e., zero and one) are discussed throughout the text (see footnotes 3 and 8).  
The production choice of the individual producer is determined by the relationship 
between the returns from the traditional crop vis a vis the returns from the GM crop. Figure 1 
illustrates the decisions and welfare of producers. The curve  t P depicts the net returns 
associated with the production of the traditional crop while the curve  gm P  graphs the net returns 
to the production of the GM crop for different levels of the differentiating attribute A. The 
intersection of the two net return curves determines the level of the differentiating attribute that 
corresponds to the indifferent producer. The producer with characteristic  gm A  given by: 










gm t gm gm
p p p p
A : A  
is indifferent between producing a unit of the traditional crop and a unit of the GM crop – the net 
returns associated with the production of these crops is the same. Producers “located” to the left 
of  gm A  (i.e., producers with A˛[0,  gm A )) find it more profitable to grow the GM crop, while 
producers “located” to the right of  gm A  (i.e., producers with A˛( gm A , 1]) find it more profitable 
to produce the traditional crop. Obviously, the greater is  gm A , the greater is the adoption of the 
new technology. Aggregate producer welfare is given by the area underneath the effective net 

































  Since producers have been assumed to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, by 
normalizing the mass of producers at unity,  gm A  gives the supply of the GM product,  gm x , i.e.,
3  
  









p p p p
x  
   
                                                 
3 The analysis can be easily modified to examine cases where producers are not uniformly distributed with respect to 
their value of A but, rather, are concentrated at either end of the continuum. Specifically, when the distribution of 
producers is continuous (but not uniform), the supply of GM crop depends on its skewness, i.e., the more skewed is 
the distribution towards 0, the greater is the adoption of the new technology. 
s
t t p p -
0   1  
Differentiating Producer Attribute (A)  
Net Returns  
s
gm gm p p -
gm A








Comparative statics results can easily be drawn from this model. More specifically, an 
increase in the price of the GM product shifts the  gm P  curve upwards and increases  gm x  while 
an increase in the price of the traditional product causes an upward shift of the  t P  curve that 














). Similarly, an increase in  s
t p  causes a downward 
shift of the  t P  curve that increases  gm x  while an increase in  s
gm p  shifts the  gm P  curve 






















gm p p p p - - ‡  all producers will find it optimal to produce the traditional 
crop and  gm x  = 0. 
 
Innovator’s Problem   
Consider now the profit-maximizing decisions of the innovating seed company that has 
developed and supplies the GM seed. The seed company’s problem can be seen as the 
determination of the price of the GM seed,  s
gm p , that maximizes its profits given the producers’ 
demand schedule for GM seed,  s
gm x . Assuming fixed proportions between seed and farm output, 
the demand for GM seed faced by the seed company is given by equation (3), i.e.,  gm
s
gm x x = , 
and the innovator’s problem can be written as:   
 
(4)  ( ) gm
s
gm p x m p max s
gm





where m represents the marginal cost of producing the GM seed. Without loss of generality, it is 
assumed that sales of the GM seed to the developing economy in question involve operation of 
the innovating firm at the part of its average cost curve where marginal costs of producing the 
GM seed are constant.
4  
Solving the innovator’s problem shows the standard result that profits are maximized at 
the price-quantity combination determined by the equality of the marginal revenue and the 
marginal cost of production. Specifically, the profit-maximizing price of the GM seed equals:   
 
(5)  ( ) [ ]
2







=   
 
and the equilibrium quantity of GM seed is given by: 
 
(6)  ( ) [ ]














Figure 2 depicts the inverse demand  s
gm D  faced by the seed company (i.e., 





gm x p p p p f g - - - - = ) and the determination of the equilibrium price and 
quantity of GM seed. The profit-maximizing price-quantity combination is determined by the 
intersection of the marginal revenue,  s
gm MR , and the marginal cost, m, curves.
5 The shadowed 
                                                 
4 Note that the marginal cost curve for the production of GM seed is likely to be either constant or decreasing. A 
non-increasing marginal cost is the outcome of the intellectual property used by the innovating firms (Fulton).  
5 The model can be easily modified to examine the profit-maximizing decisions of a small number of companies that 
produce very similar GM seed products. Assuming that the seed companies have the same marginal cost of 
production, the pricing of the GM seed is dependent on the derived demand for GM seed and the degree of market 














= . The parameter q is the 
conjectural variations elasticity that allows an examination of various types of strategic interaction among the seed 




area in Figure 2 shows the monopolistic rents accruing to the innovator/IPR holder. By 
substitution of the equilibrium price (equation (5)) for  s
gm p  in Figure 1, we obtain the 
equilibrium  gm A  (= s
gm gm x x = ) and the welfare of producers under perfect enforcement of the 
innovator’s IPRs.
6  
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= . If the firms are engaged in price competition and have no capacity constraints, q 
=0 and  m p
s
gm = . Finally, if the firms collude and act as a monopoly, q =1 and  ( ) [ ]
2








Obviously, the less monopolistic is the seed sector (i.e., the smaller is q), the closer to the perfectly competitive 
outcome is the equilibrium price-quantity combination and the greater is producer welfare.  
6 Obviously, if the intercept of 
s
gm D  lies underneath m the innovator will find it optimal not to supply this market, 
i.e.,
s
gm x  = 0. In this case, the net returns curve  gm P  becomes irrelevant (i.e., farmers have no choice of producing 
the GM crop), and producer welfare is given by the area underneath the curve  t P  in Figure 1. 
( ) gm t
s
t p p - p -















IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT OF IPRS  
Producers’ Problem   
Implicit in the previous analysis and results is the assumption that farmers comply 
completely with the provisions of the innovator’s IPRs, i.e., those producing the GM crop pay 
the price associated with the use of the GM seed,  s
gm p . Given the possibility of purchasing seeds 
from the black market at a lower price, or/and using GM seeds harvested from the previous 
year’s crop, producers may find it economically optimal to utilize the new technology without 
paying the fee associated with its use. The possibility of IPR infringement arises from an 
informational constraint, namely producers’ actions cannot be directly observed; they can only 
be verified through costly auditing. 
Assuming producers know with certainty the price of the GM seed, the penalty in case 
they are caught infringing upon the seed company’s IPRs, and the probability of being detected 
cheating, their decision on whether to cheat can be seen as decision making under uncertainty. 
Specifically, the individual producer’s choice can be viewed as a choice between the profits 
associated with the production of the traditional or the GM crop with the purchased seed and the 
expected returns from the production of GM crop with illegally used GM seeds. Assuming 
neutrality towards risk and normalizing the black market price of the GM seed to zero, the net 
returns function of the producer with attribute A becomes: 
 
A p p s
t t t g P + - =   If a unit of traditional crop is produced 
A p p s
gm gm
h





r d f P ) A ( A pgm
c





where d is the probability that illegal use of GM seed will be detected and r is the penalty 
in case of detected cheating.  
The detection probability takes values between zero and one and is assumed to be a 
function of the probability that the producer will be audited (investigated) by IPR enforcers,  0 d , 
and farm-specific characteristics that affect the observability of producer’s actions and are 
captured by the differentiating attribute A, i.e., d  = 0 d A.
 7 For instance, less efficient producers 
(i.e., producers with low values of A) are often located in secluded areas and/or their land is 
fragmented into several plots making detection of IPR infringement more difficult than 
producers with unfragmented land. In addition, “whistle blowing” by third parties (such as 
neighbors) is probably more likely when successful producers are observed cheating (due to 
envy for instance). The audit probability  0 d  is assumed to be a function of the resources spent by 
IPR enforcers in investigating producers, F, where  0 d  increases with an increase in F, although 
at a decreasing rate (i.e.,  '
0 d (F) ‡ 0,  "
0 d (F) £ 0). 
 
PROPOSITION 1.  Producers will produce the GM crop with illegally used seed when the price 
of the GM seed is greater than the expected penalty from cheating.  
Proof.  Based on the net returns function in equation (7), the producer with characteristic A will 
opt to use the GM seed illegally (i.e.,  h
gm
c
gm P P > ) when  r d ) A ( p s
gm> . 
 
                                                 
7 Note that this formulation of d can also capture cases where the technology is such that investigation of producers 
results in the detection of IPR infringement but different producers face different audit probabilities. In this case, d 
reflects the likelihood that the producer with attribute A will be audited, detected, and penalized in case of using the 




The price of the new technology and the level of enforcement affect the returns to IPR 
infringement and also the production shares of the crops under consideration. Figure 3 graphs the 
net returns from the traditional crop,  t P , the GM crop produced with purchased seeds,  h
gm P , 
and the GM crop produced with illegally used seed,  c
gm P , for different levels of the 
differentiating attribute A when  ( ) [ ]











< . In this case, the  h
gm P curve lies 
above the  c
gm P  and  t P  curves over some range of A making the production of the GM crop 
with purchased seed optimal for some producers.  
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0   1  
Differentiating Producer Attribute (A)  
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Specifically, the intersection of  h
gm P  and  t P  in Figure 3 determines the level of the 
differentiating attribute that corresponds to the producer who is indifferent between producing a 
unit of the GM crop and a unit of its traditional counterpart,  gm A , i.e.,   













p p p p
A : A  
Producers with A˛[0,  gm A ) will prefer to produce the GM crop (either with purchased or 
illegally used seeds), while producers with A˛( gm A , 1] will produce the traditional crop.  
Given the assumptions about the production and distribution of producers (i.e., unit 
production and uniform distribution),  gm A  also gives the total supply of the GM crop,  gm x . The 
quantity of the GM crop being produced illegally,  c



















x : A x = ￿ = =   
 
while the supply of GM crop produced with purchased seed,  h
gm x , equals: 
 
(9)  ( ) [ ] [ ]
( ) f g r d
r d f g r d
-










p p p p
x x x  
                                                 
8 When the assumption of a uniform distribution of producers is relaxed, the extent of IPR infringement is affected 
by the skewness of the distribution. Ceteris paribus, the greater is the number of producers with relatively low values 
of A, the greater is 
c
gm x . 
9 While the analysis assumes that illegally used seeds share the same agronomic characteristics with seeds purchased 
from the innovator, the model can be easily modified to examine the case where the illegally used seeds are of lower 
quality. If the farmer-saved seeds, for instance, result in reduced yields, the net return to production with these seeds, 
c
gm P , falls and so does 
c





If, on the other hand, the price of the GM seed is such that  ( ) [ ]












all GM crop producers will find it economically optimal to use GM seeds illegally. The 
h
gm P curve lies underneath  c
gm P  and  t P  curves over all values of A (not shown in Figure 3) 
and there is no supply of GM crop produced with purchased seeds, i.e.,  0 xh
gm = . In this case, the 
supply of GM crop equals: 
 
(10)  ( )














x : A x x
+ -
- -
= ￿ = = =  
 
Innovator’s Problem   
When enforcement of IPRs is exogenous to the innovator, the problem of the innovating 
firm can be seen as the determination of the price of the new technology (GM seed) that 
maximizes its profits given the level of IPR enforcement determined by the domestic 
government and the best response function of the producers (i.e., the demand for GM seed). 
Assuming fixed proportions between seed and farm output, the demand for GM seed is given by 
equation (9) (i.e.,  h
gm
s
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Solving the optimality conditions for  s
gm p  shows that, for a given marginal cost of 
producing the GM seed and given prices of the traditional seed, the GM crop and the traditional 
crop, the innovator’s pricing decisions depend on the level of IPR enforcement/IPR protection by 
the domestic government,  0 d r. Specifically, if  ( )










r d , the intercept of the 
derived demand for GM seed faced by the innovator is greater than or equal to the marginal cost 
of production and the optimal price-quantity combination is determined by equating marginal 
revenues with marginal costs of producing the GM seed. Mathematically, the optimal  s
gm p  is:  
 



















and the equilibrium quantity supplied by the innovator is given by: 
 
(13)  ( )
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Figure 4 graphs the determination of the equilibrium  s
gm p  and  s
gm x  when the level of 
enforcement is such that  ( )










r d . Recall that, under fixed proportions 
between seed and farm output,  s
gm x  also gives the quantity of the GM crop produced with 
purchased seed,  h
gm x , while substituting the optimal  s
gm p  into equation (8) gives the equilibrium 
quantity of GM crop that is produced with illegally used seed, i.e., 
 
(14)  ( ) [ ] ( )
( ) r d f g r d
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Figure 4.  Production and Pricing of GM Seed and Innovator’s Welfare Losses under 
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When, on the other hand,  ( )










r d , the intercept of the derived demand for 
GM seed lies underneath the marginal cost of production and the profit-maximizing seed 
company will find it optimal to exit this market i.e.,  0 xs
gm = . In this case,  h
gm P  in equation (7) 
becomes irrelevant (i.e., farmers have no choice of producing GM crop with purchased seed), 
and all GM crop is produced with illegally used seed, i.e., 
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Based on these results we can determine the consequences of imperfect IPR enforcement for the 
price and quantity of the GM seed, the adoption of the new technology, and the welfare of the 
interest groups. Specifically, 
    
PROPOSITION 2. IPR infringement reduces the price of the new technology and the quantity 
supplied by the innovator. 
Proof. Written in inverse form, the demand curve for the GM seed under imperfect IPR 
enforcement (i.e., equation (9)) is:  






gm x p p p p f g
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gm p  is the inverse form of the demand for GM seed under perfect enforcement of 
IPRs (equation (3)). Since g >f, 





<1 which implies that IPR infringement reduces the 
demand faced by the innovator. Graphically, cheating causes a counter-clockwise rotation of the 
derived demand for seed through the point at which the demand curve meets the horizontal axis 
(Figure 4). Since IPR infringement reduces both the intercept and the slope of the demand for 
GM seed, it reduces the profit maximizing price-quantity combination of the new technology. 
Specifically, comparing the equilibrium prices under perfect and imperfect enforcement of IPRs 
(equations (5) and (12), respectively) shows that IPR infringement reduces the price charged by 
the innovator by 
( ) ( ) [ ]










. Similarly, the equilibrium supply of GM seed under 
imperfect IPR enforcement (equation (13)) is reduced relative to the quantity supplied under 
perfect enforcement (equation (6)) by 
r d0 2
m
 (or, by  ( )
( ) f g -
- - -
2
m p p p gm t
s
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r d  and the innovator finds it optimal to exit this market). ￿ 
 
Note that these results are consistent with empirical evidence showing that weak 
protection of IPRs reduces imports in developing countries and distorts trade (Maskus and 
Penubarti; Smith).  
PROPOSITION 3. IPR infringement increases the adoption of the new technology by producers. 
Proof. Aggregating the quantities of GM crop produced with purchased seed (equation (13)) and 




imperfect enforcement of IPRs exceeds the quantity produced in the “perfect IPR enforcement” 
case (equation (6)) by  ( )








 (compare  gm x with  pe
gm x  in Figure 5 where the 
superscript pe stands for perfect IPR enforcement). When  ( )










r d  IPR 
infringement increases the total GM crop production by 
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Following Propositions 2 and 3 we can determine the welfare effects of IPR infringement for the 
innovating firm and producers. Specifically,  
 
PROPOSITION 4. Imperfect IPR enforcement reduces the rents accruing to the innovator. 
Proof. The reduced (derived) demand for the new technology (GM seed) faced by the innovator 
and the consequent reduced equilibrium price and quantity of GM seed when producers use GM 
seed illegally, cause innovator welfare to fall. The decrease in monopolistic rents accruing to the 
innovator equals  ( ) [ ]
















=  and is shown by the shaded area in Figure 4. 
Obviously, when  ( )










r d  no GM seed is supplied and the entire 
monopolistic rent under perfect IPR enforcement goes unrealized - IPR infringement reduces 
then innovator rents by  ( ) [ ]










t . ￿ 
 
Regarding the consequences of imperfect IPR enforcement for producers,  
 
PROPOSITION 5. IPR infringement increases the welfare of producers. It increases the welfare 
of producers that use the GM seed illegally and also the welfare of domestic producers that 
purchase the GM seed. 
Proof.  Imperfect enforcement of IPRs increases the welfare of producers that use the GM seed 
illegally by the shadowed area C in Figure 5. At the same time, IPR infringement creates a 
positive externality for producers that purchase the GM seed they use, through its effect on the 
price of the seed. Graphically, the reduction in  s
gm p  when cheating occurs shifts the  h




upwards which increases producer welfare by the hatched area AC in Figure 5. Obviously, when 
( )










r d , the curve  h
gm P  becomes ineffective and the relevant net returns 
curve associated with the production of the GM crop is shown as  ne _ c
gm P  in Figure 5. In this 
case, producer welfare gains from cheating are given by areas C+AC+NE in Figure 5.
10 ￿ 
 
Government’s Problem and Optimal Enforcement of IPRs 
The analysis in the previous sections indicates that the pricing of the new technology and 
the amount of cheating depend on the level of IPR protection. This part of the paper determines 
the optimal decisions of the government that is responsible for the enforcement of IPRs.  
The problem of the government is to determine the degree to which the innovator’s IPRs 
are enforced, knowing exactly how its decisions will affect the behavior and welfare of the seed 
company and producers. The degree to which IPRs are enforced is determined by the detection 
probability and per unit penalty parameters. Penalties on detected illegal use of GM seeds are 
often set elsewhere in the legal system. With penalties being exogenous, the only avenue policy 
makers have for influencing the agents’ behavior is through the choice of audit probability  0 d .  
Specifically, the problem of the government can be seen as the determination of the audit 
probability that maximizes the country’s welfare subject to a “minimum innovator rent” (MIR) 
constraint requiring that innovator rents do not fall below some minimum level,  R I , i.e., 
                                                 
10 While the analysis assumes that use of farmer-saved seeds is illegal, this might not necessarily be the case. When 
farmers are allowed to use seed harvested from the previous year’s crop (e.g., case of Argentina), the analysis can be 
seen as applying to use of GM seed purchased from the black market. The implications of farmers’ ability to legally 
use farmer-saved GM seeds are quite straightforward. Obviously, GM crop producers with access to saved seed will 
find it optimal to use it. Legal use of farmer-saved seeds increases producer surplus and the adoption of new 
technology while reducing the demand faced by the seed company, the price and quantity of the GM seed supplied 
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The parameters PS, TC, and IR stand for producer surplus, taxpayer costs, and innovator 
rents, respectively. Consumer surplus is not included in the objective function of the government 
since, in the small open economy case, domestic enforcement and production decisions have no 
effect on the price of the final (GM or traditional) product.   
Taxpayer costs are given by the costs associated with IPR enforcement, F( 0 d ), adjusted 
to account for the distortionary costs of taxation, i.e., TC = (1+d)F( 0 d ) (Fullerton; Ballard and 
Fullerton). Regarding producer surplus and innovator rents, they depend on the level of 
enforcement. Specifically, when  ( )










r d , producer surplus is given by: 
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and innovator rents equal:  
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s
t p p p B - - = . If, on the other hand,  ( )










r d  PS increases to  
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while innovator rents fall to zero (i.e., IR = 0).  
The Lagrangean of the government’s problem is  ( ) R I IR TC PS L - + - = l  while the 





























PROPOSITION 6. The optimal enforcement of IPRs will be such that the MIR constraint always 
binds, i.e., the optimal audit probability will be such that innovator rents are equal to  R I . 
Proof. Solving the optimality conditions for  0 d  shows that, for any minimum desirable surplus 
transfer to the innovator, domestic welfare is maximized when: 
(21)  IR IR : 0 = d  
 
The reasoning of this result is as follows. Since  0 d  decreases domestic welfare (by 























, domestic welfare is maximized when 
enforcement is such that the surplus transfer to the innovator is minimized, i.e.,  IR IR = .
11  
                                                 
11 An alternative formulation of the government’s objective function could include IR as a direct argument. 
Specifically, the problem of the government can also be modeled as  TC PS kIR W max
0 - + = q d  where q and k are 
the weights placed by the government on PS and IR, respectively. Since enforcement decreases producer welfare 




The same result also holds when penalties for IPR infringement are endogenous to the 
government, i.e., when the government has control over both  0 d  and r, enforcement is set so 
that  IR IR = . However, when the determination of fines is costless (i.e., when the cost associated 
with setting fines is negligible), the desired level of IPR enforcement can be achieved at (almost) 
zero cost. Specifically, since both audits and penalties are inversely related to the amount of GM 














), the government can 
substitute costly audits with costless fines; it can set  0 d  arbitrarily close to zero and increase 
penalties to the level at which the desired level of IPR enforcement is achieved, i.e.,  
 
(22)  IR IR : , 0 0 = @ r d  
 
Obviously, since innovator rents depend on IPR enforcement, the lower is  R I , the 
weaker is IPR protection, and the more extensive is IPR infringement in the developing country. 
 
PROPOSITION 7. When the government does not consider the effect of its choices on innovator 
rents but, instead, is merely concerned with maximizing domestic welfare, its optimal choice is to 
completely allow unauthorized use of the GM seed. 
Proof.  Substituting  0 R I =  into equation (17) shows that domestic welfare is maximized when:  
(23)  0 0 = =r d  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
determined by the relative weight placed by the government on the welfare of the interest groups and the size of 
enforcement costs, y , i.e.,  ( ) y q d , , k 0 . In this case, for given market conditions, the greater is the weight placed by 
the government on PS, or/and the greater is the size of enforcement costs, or/and the lower is the weight placed on 




When IPR infringement is allowed, domestic producer welfare is maximized (i.e., 
( ) [ ]













t t ), and enforcement costs are zero. An interesting 
implication of this result is that when innovator welfare carries no weight for the domestic 
government, IPRs will not be enforced even if the innovator wishes to incur the monitoring costs 
(in which case enforcement is costless for the government). Lack of enforcement also maximizes 
the production of the GM crop, i.e.,  
 









x x   
 
indicating that zero enforcement will also be the optimal choice of the government that has as 
objective to maximize the adoption of the new technology.
12   
 
PROPOSITION 8. When the government wishes to transfer the maximum possible amount of 
profits to the innovator, IPRs will be perfectly enforced.  
Proof. Since the value of IR is maximized under perfect enforcement of IPRs, the government 
will deter IPR infringement through the establishment of a very tiny probability of a very severe 
punishment for producers caught cheating. Substituting  ( ) [ ]









t  into the 
government’s problem shows that the government will find it optimal to set: 
                                                 
12 Note that the equilibrium under  0 0 = = r d  will emerge also when the IPRs granted to the innovator in its home 
country are not valid (i.e., are not protected) in the developing country under concern (e.g., case of patents and plant 
variety protections that are valid in individual countries only). The reason is that, in such a case, use of the new 
technology without paying royalty fees to the innovator is not illegal, i.e., the expected loss from IPR infringement 










Because infringement is completely deterred when innovator rents are valued highly by the 
government, the production decisions by producers, the pricing of the new technology, and the 
welfare of the interest groups are those under perfect enforcement of IPRs derived earlier.    
Since the optimal amount of enforcement is determined by  R I , the question that 
naturally arises is what are the determinants of the size of the minimum desirable surplus transfer 
to the innovator.  
Factors affecting  R I  include (but are not limited to): (i) the political influence of the 
innovating firm in the developing country, (ii) the bilateral relationship with, and the fear of 
retaliation from, the country of origin of the innovating firm, (iii) the severity of the sanctions in 
case the developing country is successfully convicted for imperfectly enforcing the innovator’s 
IPRs, (iv) the conjectures of the domestic government regarding the effect of its enforcement 
policy on the future development of (and domestic access to) new technologies,
13 and (v) the size 
of the enforcement costs. All these are factors that affect the importance being placed by the 
government on the welfare of the innovating firm and thus, the size of  R I .     
Obviously, the greater is the political influence of the innovator, or/and the stronger is the 
relationship between the developing country and the country of origin of the innovating firm, 
or/and the greater is the likelihood that imperfect IPR enforcement will be detected and 
successfully convicted, or/and the greater is the severity of potential retaliatory sanctions, or/and 
                                                 
13 If the government believes that its actions have no effect on innovators’ investment decisions (i.e., “too small to 
count”), it is less likely that IPRs will be enforced. The impact of domestic policy on future development of new 
technologies depends on the size of the domestic market. The smaller is the domestic market, the smaller is the 
effect of government’s enforcement decisions on total innovator rents, and the weaker will be the incentives for IPR 




the stronger is the belief of the government that extensive violation of IPRs will adversely affect 
the future development of new technologies (and domestic producer access to them), or/and the 
lower are the resource costs associated with IPR enforcement, the greater is  R I , and the greater 
is the level of IPR enforcement in the developing country.
14  
In this context, given the developing countries’ vocal opposition to the granting of IPRs 
for agricultural crops, the lack of an effective mechanism that will monitor IPR enforcement 
around the world, the lack of an agreement on the penalty associated with IPR violation, the 
small size of most developing economies, and the significant resource costs of monitoring 
farmers, the weak IPR protection in these countries should come to no surprise. 
 
EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL 
No Labeling of GM Products 
Consider now the situation where the final (GM or/and traditional) products are not 
labelled. In this case, the GM crop and its traditional counterpart are marketed together and the 
price received by producers is the same regardless of which crop is produced – there is no price 
premium received by producers of the traditional crop i.e.,  gm t p p =  (Giannakas and Fulton). 
The lack of a price premium for the traditional crop increases the relative profitability of the GM 
crop and affects the quantitative nature of the results derived in the previous two sections.  
  
                                                 
14 Note that it is not actually necessary for the innovator to be a foreign firm for the previous analysis to hold – the 
main results also apply to the case where the innovator is a firm from the developing country. Specifically, when the 
innovator is a domestic firm, the optimal level of IPR protection (and, thus, the pricing and adoption of the new 
technology in this country) is still determined by the political preferences of the government i.e., the minimum 
desirable transfer to the innovator. However, since surplus is redistributed domestically when the innovator is a firm 
from the developing country, it can be hypothesized that innovator rents carry a greater weight for the government 




PROPOSITION 9. When compared to the labeling case, no labeling of GM products increases 
the demand for GM seed by producers,  s
gm x , the price of the new technology charged by the 
innovator,  s
gm p , and the adoption of the new technology in the developing country,  gm x , no 
matter if enforcement of IPRs is perfect or not. When IPR enforcement is imperfect, no labeling 
increases both the supply of GM crop produced with purchased seed,  h
gm x , and the quantity of 
GM crop produced with illegally used seed,  c
gm x .     
Proof. Substituting zero for  gm t p p -  in equations (5), (6), (12), and (13) results in higher  s
gm x , 
s
gm p , and  gm x  under both enforcement scenarios. Specifically, in the benchmark case where 
enforcement of IPRs is perfect, no labeling of GM products increases  s
gm x  (and  gm x ) by 
( ) f g -
-
2
p p gm t  and  s
gm p  by 
2
p p gm t -
. When enforcement is imperfect, no labeling increases  s
gm x  
and  s
gm p  by  ( )
( ) f g -
-
2
p p gm t  and  ( )








, respectively. Finally, no labeling results in 
increased cheating and increased adoption of the new technology relative to the labeling case 
(i.e.,  c
gm x  and  gm x  increase by  ( )
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PROPOSITION 10. When compared to the labeling case, no labeling of GM products reduces 
the likelihood that the innovator will exit the market.     
The level of IPR enforcement,  r d0 , required for the innovator to supply the market (i.e., for 
s
gm x > 0) is reduced from  ( )




t - - -
-f g










the no labeling case. Since no labeling reduces this critical level of enforcement, it increases the 
likelihood that a realized level of IPR enforcement will exceed the critical one, and, thus, the 
likelihood that the innovator will find it optimal to supply this market. ￿   
 
Enforcement is Endogenous to Innovator   
The previous analysis and results are based on the assumption that enforcement of IPRs is 
the responsibility of the developing country’s government. This part of the paper examines the 
situation where IPR enforcement is endogenous to the innovating firm. Two scenarios are 
examined. In the first scenario, the innovating seed company is responsible for auditing the 
producers but penalties are set in the developing country. In the second scenario, the seed 
company has control over both audits and the magnitude of fines on detected IPR violators. 
 
PROPOSITION 11. When the innovator is responsible for monitoring the producers and 
penalties are exogenous, the optimal audit probability depends on the size of the enforcement 
costs. The greater are the resource costs of enforcing the IPRs, the lower is the optimal 
enforcement. When enforcement costs are relatively high, exit from the market is the optimal 
policy of the firm. 
Proof. Incorporating monitoring and enforcement costs of the form  ( ) 0 0 yd d F =  into the 
innovator’s objective function (i.e., equation (11)) and maximizing with respect to d0 shows that 
the optimal audit probability depends on the size of the enforcement costs y. Specifically, the 
optimality conditions indicate that if y is less than a critical value 
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p m p -
= . When, on the other hand, y is greater than (or equal to) y
+, the 
innovator will find it optimal to not supply this market (and  0 0 = d ). In this case,  h
gm P  in 
equation (7) becomes irrelevant and all GM crop is produced with illegally used seed. ￿ 
 
The situation is different when the innovator controls both  0 d  and r.      
     
PROPOSITION 12. When penalties are endogenous to the innovator, cheating is completely 
deterred through the establishment of enormous fines for producers caught violating the 
innovator’s IPRs. In this case, the production decisions by producers, the pricing of the new 
technology, and the welfare of the interest groups are those under perfect enforcement of IPRs.     
Proof. Solving the problem of the innovating firm with respect to both  0 d  and r shows that the 
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. ￿  
 
Even though the possibility that the foreign innovating firm will be delegated the 
establishment of (severe) penalties for IPR violators is potentially conceivable, it is not 
particularly appealing. While innovators can (and do) lobby for increased fines for IPR 
infringement, the punishment of detected cheaters will most likely lie with the domestic 
government. In this case, unless the government of the developing country is forced to establish 




the level of IPR enforcement will still be determined by the minimum desirable surplus transfer 
to the innovator,  R I  (i.e., IR IR : = r  " 0 d ).  
Specifically, if the government does not consider the effect of its choices on innovator 
welfare (i.e., if  0 R I = ), IPR infringement will go unpunished (i.e., r = 0), the innovating firm 
will exit this market and  0 d =0 (from Proposition 11, when r = 0, y
+ falls to zero and  0 0 = d ). 
On the other hand, if the government desires to maximize innovator rents, it will severely 
penalize detected IPR violators (i.e., r = ￿), and IPRs will be perfectly enforced (from 
Proposition 11, when r is ￿, y
+ rises to ￿, and  0 d  reduces to (almost) zero).  
The perfect enforcement of IPRs through the establishment of enormous fines, however, 
raises the question as to whether large fines for IPR infringement are reasonable. The literature 
on the economics of crime provides some guidance and evidence on this issue. Specifically, it 
has been argued that severe punishment for minor law violations (i.e., Becker’s “optimal fine” 
result) is neither costless, credible nor just. The imposition of disproportionate fines would likely 
offend the public sense of justice; in short, justice requires that the punishment fit the crime 
(Carr-Hill and Stern; Stern; Stigler; Shavell; Cowell). If producer compliance through the 
establishment of enormous and costless fines is indeed infeasible, then violation of IPRs will 
always be an issue and should be incorporated into economic analysis.  
 
FURTHER CONSEQUENCES OF IPR INFRINGEMENT   
The results on the consequences of IPR infringement can help explain differential pricing 





PROPOSITION 13. Different levels of IPR enforcement rationalize different prices for the same 
technology charged by innovators in different countries around the world. 
Proof. It has been shown that the level of IPR enforcement is influenced by the importance being 
placed by the government/IPR enforcer on innovator rents and influences the demand for the 
new technology. The lower is enforcement, the greater is IPR infringement, and the lower is the 
demand for the new technology. The lower is the demand faced by the innovator, the lower is the 
price that maximizes its profits. Thus, differences in IPR enforcement in different countries 
result in, ceteris paribus, different prices set by the profit-maximizing innovator that can price 
discriminate. ￿  
 
From Proposition 13 it follows that: 
 
PROPOSITION 14. IPR infringement increases the competitiveness of domestic producers that 
utilize the new technology by placing foreign producers that comply with the provisions of 
innovator’s IPRs at a cost disadvantage. 
Proof. Since IPR infringement reduces the price of the new technology in the domestic country, 
the greater is the extend of IPR violation, the lower is the price of the new technology and the 
greater is the cost advantage of domestic producers relative to producers in countries where IPRs 
are more effectively enforced. ￿  
Therefore, the effect of IPR infringement on the welfare of producers that comply with 
the provisions of the innovator’s IPRs depends on the market the “honest” producers operate. 
Infringement of IPRs benefits “honest” producers of the country where IPR enforcement is lax 




countries with increased compliance (reduced cheating) at a cost disadvantage. Reduced 
enforcement and allowance of IPR infringement can thus be viewed as a strategic choice of 
governments aiming at providing a competitive edge to domestic users of the new technology.      
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The introduction of IPRs is one of the most notable features of agricultural 
biotechnology. So are growing concerns about the widespread infringement of IPRs in 
developing countries. This study develops a model of heterogeneous producers to examine the 
economic causes of IPR infringement and its consequences for the welfare of the interest groups 
and the pricing and adoption of a new technology (a GM seed) in the context of a small open 
developing economy. Enforcement of IPRs, and pricing and adoption of the new technology are 
modeled as a sequential game between the government that enforces the IPRs, a foreign 
innovating firm that prices the GM seed, and the domestic farmers who make the production and 
cheating decisions.  
Analytical results show that producer compliance with IPR provisions is not the natural 
outcome of self-interest and complete deterrence of IPR infringement is not always economically 
optimal. IPR infringement affects the welfare of the interest groups and has important 
ramifications for the pricing and adoption of the new technology. Specifically, violation of 
innovator’s IPRs reduces the price of the new technology. While the quantity supplied by the 
innovator falls with IPR infringement, the adoption of the new technology increases when 
producers use the GM seed illegally. This is true no matter if the final GM (or/and traditional) 




however. In general, when compared to labeling, no labeling increases the price and adoption of 
the new technology, while reducing the likelihood that the innovator will exit the market.  
The reduced price of the new technology under imperfect IPR protection means that 
while IPR infringement reduces the rents accruing to the innovator/IPR holder, it increases the 
welfare of all developing country’s producers - imperfect IPR enforcement increases the welfare 
of IPR violators and also the welfare of producers that purchase the GM seed they use.  
Since IPR infringement increases the welfare of domestic producers while reducing 
innovator rents, the level of optimal enforcement is determined by the political preferences of the 
government. The lower is the importance the developing country’s government places on foreign 
innovator rents, the lower is the level of IPR enforcement, and the lower is innovator’s ability to 
obtain value for its biotech traits.  
When the government does not consider the effect of its choices on innovator rents but, 
instead, is merely concerned with maximizing domestic welfare, its optimal choice is to leave 
IPR infringement unpunished. This is true even if the innovator incurs enforcement costs. The 
innovating firm’s ability to obtain value for its biotech traits is then eliminated and, as a 
consequence, the firm exits this market. On the other hand, enforcement will be perfect when 
innovator welfare is valued highly by the government and/or when the innovating firm controls 
both audits and penalties for IPR infringement. While the investigation of producers by the 
innovating firm is possible, the delegation of domestic producers’ punishment to a foreign firm is 
not very likely. When the innovating firm audits producers but penalties are set in the developing 
country, enforcement of IPRs is effectively determined by the domestic government.  
Different governments can be expected to have different attitudes towards innovator 




the extent of IPR violation, differences in the level of IPR protection provide an alternative 
justification for (and explanation of) differences in the pricing of the new technology in different 
countries around the world – a strategy adopted by leading innovators in the sector. 
Consequently, IPR infringement increases the competitiveness of domestic producers that utilize 
the new technology by placing foreign producers that comply with the provisions of innovator’s 
IPRs at a cost disadvantage. Lax IPR enforcement can thus be used strategically by governments 
aiming at increasing the competitiveness of their producers in the international arena. 
Given the absence of an effective supranational monitoring agency and the lack of an 
agreement on the penalties associated with IPR violation, the benefits from IPR infringement 
rationalize the lax enforcement and widespread violation of IPRs in developing countries. In 
terms of the TRIPs agreement, it seems to be well understood that the outcome of the on going 
negotiations on the magnitude of fines for IPR infringement will be critical for the future level of 
protection enjoyed by innovators/IPR holders. What needs to be understood equally well 
however, is that if IPRs are to be effectively enforced it is necessary for the TRIPs agreement to 
go beyond the norms of GATT.  
Given that developing country’s welfare gains from lax IPR enforcement exceed the 
innovator’s losses, if the penalties determined under the TRIPs agreement follow the custom of 
retaliatory sanctions under the GATT and reflect losses to the innovator, they will be proved 
insufficient in providing adequate incentives for IPR protection. Unless the WTO manages 
through the TRIPs agreement to “exceed its limits” and establish an effective enforcement 
mechanism, enforcement of IPRs will remain imperfect and innovators’ ability to obtain value 




developing countries’ opposition to IPRs, an agreement on the establishment of fines that would 
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